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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the Evertsen 
Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the South Ogden City 
Planning Commission's ("Planning Commission") November 12, 1992 meeting was 
not time barred by the 15-day limitation period set forth in section 25-7-6 of the 
South Ogden City Zoning Ordinance (South Ogden City, Ut., Zoning Ordinance § 
25-7-6 (1992)). Whether a statute of limitation applies to a cause of action is a 
question of law, not of fact. Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 1990). 
When an appeal presents only questions of law, the reviewing court will review 
the trial court's rulings for correctness and accord them no particular deference. 
Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
2. Whether the District Court failed to properly rule that the 
Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of"notice given for the Planning 
Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred by the 30-day 
limitation period set forth in section 10-9-103(2) of the Utah Municipal Land Use 
Development and Management Act (Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-103(2) (1993)). 
Whether a statute of limitation applies to a cause of action is a question of law, 
not of fact. Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d at 869. When an appeal presents only 
questions of law, the reviewing court will review the trial court's rulings for 
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correctness and accord them no particular deference. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d at 1070. 
3. Whether the District Court failed to properly rule that the 
Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning 
Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred by the 30-day 
limitation period set forth in section 10-9-1001 of the Utah Municipal Land Use 
Development and Management Act (Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1993)). 
Whether a statute of limitation applies to a cause of action is a question of law, 
not of fact. Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d at 869. When an appeal presents only 
questions of law, the reviewing court will review the trial court's rulings for 
correctness and accord them no particular deference. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d at 1070. 
4. Whether the District Court failed to properly rule that the 
Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning 
Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred by the 90-day 
limitation period set forth in section 52-4-8 of the Utah Open and Public Meetings 
Act (Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8 (1993)). Whether a statute of limitation applies to a 
cause of action is a question of law, not of fact. Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d at 
869. When an appeal presents only questions of law, the reviewing court will 
review the trial court's rulings for correctness and accord them no particular 
deference. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d at 1070. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-103(2) (1993): 
(a) A municipality meets the requirements of reasonable 
notice required by this chapter if it: 
(i) posts notice of the hearing or meeting in at least 
three public places within the jurisdiction and publishes notice 
of the hearing or meeting in a newspaper of general circulation 
in the jurisdiction, if one is available; or 
(ii) gives actual notice of the hearing or meeting. 
(b) A municipal legislative body may enact an ordinance 
establishing stricter notice requirements than those required by 
this subsection. 
(c) (i) Proof that one of the two forms of notice 
authorized by this subsection was given is prima facie evidence 
that notice was properly given. 
(ii) If notice given under the authority of this section 
is not challenged as provided in Section 10-9-1001 within 30 
days from the date of the meeting for which the notice was 
given, the notice is considered adequate and proper. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1993): 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's 
land use decisions made under this chapter or under the 
regulation made under authority of this chapter until that 
person has exhausted his administrative remedies. 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in 
the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition 
for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days 
after the local decision is rendered. 
3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations 
are valid; 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8 (1993): 
Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3 and 
52-4-6 is voidable by a court of competent jurisdiction. Suit to 
void final action shall be commenced within 90 days after the 
action except that with respect to any final action concerning 
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the issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of 
indebtedness suit shall be commenced within 30 days after the 
action. 
South Ogden City, Utah, Zoning Ordinance § 25-7-6 (1992): 
Appeal to and Review by the City Council. The decision of the 
Planning Commission shall not become final and effective until 
fifteen days after notice of that decision has been mailed or 
delivered to the applicant and delivered to the City Recorder 
for presentation to the City Council. It shall not then become 
final, if, prior to the expiration of that fifteen days, any 
interested party has appealed the same to the City Recorder or 
the City Council on its own motion has elected to review that 
decision. 
The decision of the Planning Commission may be appealed by 
any interested party to the City Council by filing such appeal 
with the City Recorder within fifteen days after notice of 
decision is sent to the applicant. The City Council may review 
that decision on its own motion made within that fifteen day 
period. 
South Ogden City, Utah, Zoning Ordinance, Article 7 (1992): 
See Addendum, Attachment 1. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 12, 1992, the South Ogden City Planning Commission 
("Planning Commission") held a public meeting and granted Appellant American 
Capital Development, Inc. ("American Capital") a conditional use permit to 
construct an 80-unit apartment complex on real property located in South Ogden 
City, Utah pursuant to Article 7 of the South Ogden City Zoning Ordinance 
(South Ogden City, Ut. Zoning Ordinance §§ 25-7-1 through -8 (1992), a copy of 
which is annexed hereto as Attachment 1). On April 29, 1993, the Evertsen 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, 
State of Utah (the "District Court") wherein they asked the District Court to set 
aside or rescind American Capital's conditional use permit. The Evertsen Plaintiffs 
alleged that the notice given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 
public meeting had been inadequate. On May 24, 1993, the District Court 
convened a hearing on the Evertsen Plaintiffs' complaint. After hearing 
arguments from the parties, the District Court ruled from the bench that the 
Evertsen Plaintiffs would have until May 28, 1993 to file an appeal of the 
Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 decision with the South Ogden City 
Council ("City Council"). The District Court did not enter its bench ruling. On 
May 28, 1993, the Evertsen Plaintiffs filed their appeal with the City Council. On 
October 6, 1993, American Capital timely moved the District Court to reconsider 
its bench ruling of May 24, 1993. On October 20, 1993, the District Court heard 
American Capital's motion. American Capital argued that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' 
SLCl-7707.1 21928 0001 1 0 
challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning Commission's 
November 12, 1992 meeting was (1) time barred by a 15-day limitation period set 
forth in Section 25-7-6 of the South Ogden City Zoning Ordinance (South Ogden 
City, Ut„ Zoning Ordinance § 25-7-6 (1992)), (2) time barred by the 30 day 
limitation periods set forth in Section 10-9-103(2)(c)(ii) and Section 10-9-1001(2) of 
the Utah Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act (Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 10-9-101 through -1003 (1993)), and (3) time barred by a 90-day limitation 
period set forth in Section 52-4-8 of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act (Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1 through -9 (1993)). On October 20, 1993, the District Court 
convened a hearing on American Capital's motion for reconsideration and, after 
hearing arguments from the parties, denied the motion. On February 8, 1994, the 
District Court entered its October 20, 1993 bench ruling and issued an Order in 
which it concluded that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice 
given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 decision was not time 
barred by the 15-day limitation period set forth in Section 25-7-6 of the South 
Ogden City Zoning Ordinance. The District Court's Order did not rule on the 
applicability of other statutory limitation periods cited by American Capital in its 
motion for reconsideration. This Appeal is from the Order entered by the District 
Court on February 8, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 29, 1992, American Capital applied to the Planning 
Commission for a conditional use permit to construct an 80-unit apartment 
SLC1-7707.1 21928 0001 11 
housing complex on property located at approximately 5700 Wasatch Drive in 
South Ogden City, Utah (the "Project"). (Record Index at p. 190-191). 
2. The Planning Commission placed American Capital's application 
for a conditional use permit on the agenda of its November 12, 1992 public 
meeting. (Record Index at p. 69-70). 
3. The Planning Commission and the City posted notice of the 
November 12, 1992 Planning Commission meeting in three places within the City. 
(Record Index at p. 187). 
4. On November 12, 1992, the Planning Commission held a public 
meeting and considered American Capital's application for a conditional use 
permit. (Record Index at p. 70). At this meeting, the Planning Commission 
approved American Capital's application and granted American Capital a 
conditional use permit to construct the Project. (Record Index at p. 267). 
5. Section 25-7-6 of the South Ogden City Zoning Ordinance 
("Zoning Ordinance") provides that decisions of the Planning Commission become 
"final and effective" if no interested party appeals the decision to the City Council 
within 15 days. South Ogden City, Ut., Zoning Ordinance § 25-7-6 (1992). The 
Evertsen Plaintiffs first challenged the Planning Commission's decision to grant 
American Capital a conditional use permit on April 29, 1993 - 168 days after the 
Planning Commission had granted American Capital its conditional use permit. 
(Record Index at p. 267). 
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6. Section 10-9-103(2) of the UMLUDMA provides that public notice 
given for the meetings of municipal zoning authorities must be challenged within 
30 days from the date of the meeting for which the notice was given; otherwise, 
"the notice is considered adequate and proper/ ' Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-103(2) 
(1993). The Evertsen Plaintiffs first challenged the notice given for the Planning 
Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting on April 15, 1993 - 154 days after the 
Planning Commission had granted American Capital its conditional use permit. 
(Record Index at p. 30). 
7. Section 10-9-1001 of the UMLUDMA provides that persons who 
are adversely affected by a city's land use planning decisions may petition the 
district court to review that decision, provided they do so within 30 days of the 
city's decision. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(2) (1993). The Evertsen Plaintiffs first 
petitioned the District Court to review the Planning Commission's decision to 
grant American Capital a conditional use permit on April 29, 1993 — 168 days 
after the Planning Commission had granted American Capital its conditional use 
permit. (Record Index at p. 267). 
8. Section 52-4-8 of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act 
("UOPMA") provides that any suit to void the action of a public body for failure to 
give adequate notice of a public meeting must be commenced within 90 days. 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8 (1993). The Evertsen Plaintiffs first brought suit against 
the City and the Planning Commission on April 29, 1993 - 168 days after the 
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Planning Commission had granted American Capital its conditional use permit. 
(Record Index at p. 267). 
9. On April 29, 1993, The Evertsen Plaintiffs filed a "Complaint" in the 
Second Judicial District Court wherein they asked the court to set aside or rescind 
American Capital's conditional use permit because they alleged that the notice 
given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting had been 
inadequate. (Record Index at p. 267). On May 6, 1993, the Evertsen Plaintiffs 
filed a "First Amended Complaint" asking for the same relief prayed for in its April 
29, 1993 Complaint. (Record Index at p. 107). 
10. On May 24, 1993, the District Court convened a hearing to hear 
the Evertsen Plaintiffs' Complaint. (Record Index at p. 137). After hearing 
arguments from the parties, the District Court ruled from the bench that the 
Evertsen Plaintiffs would have until May 28, 1993 to file an appeal of the 
Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 decision with the City Council. 
(Record Index at p. 138). The District Court did not enter its bench ruling at this 
time. (Record Index at p. 138). 
11. On May 28, 1993, the Evertsen Plaintiffs filed their appeal with 
the City Council. (Record Index at p . 267). 
12. On July 27, 1993, the City Council convened a public meeting to 
hear the Evertsen Plaintiffs' appeal. (Record Index at p. 267). At the conclusion 
of this meeting, the City Council voted to revoke American Capital's conditional 
use permit. (Record Index at p. 269). 
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13. On October 5, 1993, American Capital timely moved the District 
Court to reconsider its bench ruling of May 24, 1993. (Record Index at p. 269). 
14. On October 20, 1993, the District Court heard American Capital's 
Motion for Reconsideration. (Record Index at p. 234). American Capital argued 
that: 
a. The Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice 
given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred 
by the 15-day limitation period set forth in section 25-7-6 of the Zoning 
Ordinance. (Record Index at p. 180). 
b . The Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice 
given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred 
by the 30-day limitation period set forth in section 10-9-103(2) of the UMLUDMA. 
(Record Index at p. 182). 
c. The Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice 
given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred 
by the 30-day limitation period set forth in section 10-9-1001(2) of the 
UMLUDMA. (Record Index at p. 182). 
d. The Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice 
given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred 
by the 90-day limitation period set forth in section 52-4-8 of the UOPMA. (Record 
Index at p. 183). 
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e. Due to the expiration of all relevant statutory limitation 
periods, the City Council could not have lawfully heard the Evertsen Plaintiffs' 
appeal on July 27, 1993. (Record Index at p. 168). 
15. On October 20, 1993, the District Court ruled from the bench and 
denied American Capital's Motion for Reconsideration. (Record Index at p. 234). 
16. On February 8, 1994, the District Court entered its October 20, 
1993 bench ruling and issued an Order in which it made the following "Findings of 
Fact:" 
a. "On November 12, 1992, the South Ogden City Planning 
Commission granter [sic] Intervenor-Defendant American Capital Development, 
Inc. ('American Capital') a conditional use permit to construct an apartment 
complex in South Ogden ('Project')." (Record Index at p. 268). 
b. "On the 29th day of April, 1993, Plaintiffs obtained an Order 
prohibiting further activity by the South Ogden Planning Commission on the 
Project." (Record Index at p. 268). 
c. "Based upon the above-referenced Order, Plaintiffs 
commenced legal seeking [sic] relief from the Court as follows ... [f]or an order of 
the Court staying all time periods of appeal to the City council [sic] from the 
Planning Commission, said stay running from the date of the issuance of the 
Conditional Use Permit forward to such applicable date that the Plaintiffs may 
submit a proper appeal to the City Council on the issuance of Conditional [sic] 
Use Permit." (Record Index at p. 268-69). 
SLC1-7707.1 21928 0001 16 
d. "Plaintiffs commence [sic] that the aforesaid legal action and 
[sic] assert as that principle cause that they had not received effective notice of 
the November 12, 1992 Planning Commission meeting." (Record Index at p. 269). 
e. "On a bench ruling of May 24, 1993, this Court found that 
the Plaintiffs had not received effective notice of the November 12, 1992 Meeting 
[sic]. And this Court granted the relief request [sic] by Plaintiffs, to wit extending 
the time to which Plaintiffs could appeal the Planning Commission issuance [sic] 
of the conditions [sic] used [sic] for American Capital to the South Ogden City 
Council." (Record Index at p. 269). 
f. "On May 28, 1993, Plaintiffs filed their appeal of the 
Planning Commission's issuance of the conditions [sic] used [sic] for American 
Capital with the South Ogden City Council." (Record Index at p. 269). 
g. "On July 27, 1993, the City Council heard Plaintiffs' appeal 
and revoked American Capital's conditional use permit." (Record Index at p. 269). 
h. "Plaintiffs, American Capital and South Ogden City all acted 
in reliance upon the bench ruling of the Court." (Record Index at p. 269). 
i. "American Capital filed on October 5, 1993, a motion asking 
the Court to reconsider its bench ruling." (Record Index at p. 269). 
17. The District Court's February 8, 1994 Order contained the 
following "Conclusions of Law:" 
SLCl-7707.1 21928 0001 17 
a. "Public notice of the Planning Commission's November 12, 
1992 meeting was inadequate because the City did not give adequate notice to the 
effective landowners." (Record Index at p. 270). 
b. "That all parties in the litigation acted in reliance upon the 
May 24, 1993 bench ruling of the Court. Plaintiffs [sic] challenge [sic] the 
adequacy of the November 12, 1992 meeting was not barred by the 15 day 
limitation periods [sic] set forth in §25-7-6 in the South Ogden City Zoning 
Ordinance." (Record Index at p. 270). 
c. "NOW THEREFORE it is hereby ordered that American 
Capital's Motion for Reconsideration of the May 24, 1993 bench warrant [sic] is 
denied." (Record Index at p. 270). 
SLCl-7707.1 21928 0001 18 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On April 29, 1993, the Evertsen Plaintiffs filed a district court suit 
challenging the notice given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 
meeting; this suit was filed 168 days after the November 12, 1992 Planning 
Commission meeting. The District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen 
Plaintiffs' suit was time barred by the 15-day limitation period set forth in the City 
Zoning Ordinance, the 30-day limitation periods set forth in the Utah Municipal 
Land Use Development and Management Act, and/or the 90-day limitation period 
set forth in the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. The Evertsen Plaintiffs did 
not prove, nor did the District Court find, that the Evertsen Plaintiffs had been 
deprived of any constitutionally protected interests as a result of the action taken 
by the Planning Commission on November 12, 1992. Accordingly, the District 
Court could not have lawfully concluded that the aforementioned statutory 
limitation periods were inapplicable to the Evertsen Plaintiffs' suit. Therefore, the 
District Court committed plain error by failing to conclude that the Evertsen 
Plaintiffs' district court suit was time barred. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court erroneously ruled that the Evertsen Plaintiffs1 appeal 
of the Planning Commission's decision was not time barred by the 15-
day appeal period set forth in the City Zoning Ordinance, 
Section 25-7-6 of the South Ogden City Zoning Ordinance provides the 
procedure for appeal and review of Planning Commission decisions. It requires 
an appeal to be filed with the City Recorder within 15 days after notice of the 
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Planning Commission's decision is sent to the applicant; if an appeal of a Planning 
Commission decision is not filed within 15 days, the Planning Commission's 
decision becomes "final and effective:" 
Appeal to and Review by the City Council. The decision of the 
Planning Commission shall not become final and effective until 
fifteen days after notice of that decision has been mailed or 
delivered to the applicant and delivered to the City Recorder 
for presentation to the City Council. It shall not then become 
final if, prior to the expiration of that fifteen days, any 
interested party has appealed the same to the City Recorder or 
the City Council on its own motion has elected to review that 
decision. 
The decision of the Planning Commission may be appealed by 
any interested party to the City Council by filing such appeal 
with the City Recorder within fifteen days after notice of 
decision is sent to the applicant. The City Council may review 
that decision on its own motion made within that fifteen day 
period. 
South Ogden City, U t , Zoning Ordinance § 25-7-6 (1992) (emphasis supplied). 
The Utah Supreme Court enforces appellate limitation periods contained 
in the zoning ordinances of local governments. In Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows 
Co., 392 P.2d 40, 41 (Utah 1964), a landowner sought to enjoin a defendant 
developer from building a mobile home park for which the developer had been 
issued a county building permit. The trial court dismissed the action because the 
plaintiff had not appealed the issuance of the building permit to the Salt Lake 
County Board of Adjustments within the 90-day appeal period prescribed by the 
Salt Lake County zoning ordinance1 and authorized by the then applicable Utah 
1
 Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment General Rules of Procedure, July 16, 1963, General Rule of Procedure III: "An 
appeal to the Board of Adjustments must be taken within ninety (90) days after the cause arises or the appeal will not be 
considered by the Board of Adjustments/ Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 392 P.2d at 41, n. 1. 
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County Land Use Development and Management Act.2 Id. at 41-42 (citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27-16 (1953)). The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
decision: 
The 90-day limitation period [authorized by] Sec. 17-27-16 is 
designed to assure speedy appeal to the proper tribunal any 
grievance that a party may have who is adversed by a decision 
of an administrative agency. The evident purpose of the 
statute is to assure the expeditious and orderly development of 
a community, etc. ... But where, as in this case, the alleged 
violation of the ordinance arose from the administration of a 
zoning ordinance by an administrative officer or agency, as 
provided in Sec. 17-27-16, appeal from that administrative 
ruling should have been taken to the proper administrative 
tribunal, or a suit should have been commenced in the courts 
within the statutory period provided for in Sec. 17-27-16, which 
in this case is 90 days. 
Id. at 42 (footnotes omitted). 
As in Lund, the Evertsen Plaintiffs failed to appeal the Planning 
Commission's decision within the 15-day appeal period prescribed by the South 
Ogden City Zoning Ordinance. The Evertsen Plaintiffs first challenged the 
Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 decision on April 15, 1993, 154 days 
after the Planning Commission had issued American Capital its conditional use 
permit. (Record Index at p. 30). As a result, American Capital's conditional use 
permit became "final and effective" on November 28, 1993, pursuant to Section 25-
7-6 of the South Ogden City Zoning Ordinance. South Ogden City, Ut., Zoning 
2
 Utah Code section 17-27-16 provided that "Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved 
..., or by the decision of any administrative officer or agency based upon or made in the course of the administration or 
enforcement of the provisions of the zoning resolution . . . . The time within which such appeal must be made ... shall be as 
specified in the general rules provided in writing by the board of county commissioners ... / Lund v. Cottonwood hAtadows 
Co., 392 P.2d at 42, n. 2 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-16 (1953)). 
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Ordinance § 25-7-6 (1992). Because the Evertsen Plaintiffs did not 'take' their appeal 
to the proper administrative tribunal within the requisite limitation period as 
required by Lund, their appeal of the Planning Commission's decision became time 
barred. Therefore, contrary to section 25-7-6 cf the Zoning Ordinance and the 
Utah Supreme Court's Lund decision, the District Court erroneously permitted 
Plaintiff-Appellees to appeal the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 
decision to the City Council after the Zoning Ordinance's 15-day appellate 
limitation period had expired. 
II. The District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs1 
challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning 
Commission's meeting was time barred by the 30-day 'challenge to 
notice1 limitation period set forth in the UMLUDMA. 
Section 10-9-103 of the UMLUDMA provides a 30-day limitation period 
within which persons must challenge the adequacy of notice given for a meeting 
of a municipal zoning authority: 
If notice given under the authority of this section is not 
challenged as provided in Section 10-9-1001 within 30 days 
from the date of the meeting for which the notice was given, 
the notice is considered adequate and proper. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-103(2)(c)(ii) (1993) (emphasis supplied). The District Court 
failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' April 29, 1993 challenge to the 
adequacy of notice given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 
meeting was time barred by the UMLUDMA. By the plain language of section 
10-9-103 of the UMLUDMA, the notice given for the Planning Commission's 
November 12, 1992 meeting was "considered adequate and proper" on December 
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13, 1992 — 31 days after the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting. 
The Evertsen Plaintiffs' April 29, 1993 challenge to the notice given for the 
November 12, 1992 Planning Commission meeting was untimely because it was 
brought 168 days after that meeting. Pursuant to Section 10-9-103 of the 
UMLUDMA and the Utah Supreme Court's Lund decision, no lawful basis for the 
Evertsen Plaintiffs' appeal existed at the time the District Court ordered the City 
Council to hear the Evertsen Plaintiffs' appeal. Therefore, the District Court failed 
to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' appeal was time barred by the 
UMLUDMA. 
III. The District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' 
challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning 
Commission's meeting was time barred by the 30-day "procedural 
limitation1 period set forth in the UMLUDMA. 
As noted in point II., above, section 10-9-103 of the UMLUDMA 
provides that challenges to the adequacy of notice given for city zoning meetings 
must be brought within 30 days of the meeting and within the procedural 
limitation period set forth in section 10-9-1001 of the UMLUDMA. Section 10-9-
1001 provides, in part, that: 
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in 
the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition 
for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days 
afte* the local decision is rendered. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(2) (1993) (emphasis supplied). The Evertsen 
Plaintiffs did not petition the District Court to review the Planning Commission's 
decision within the 30 day ' procedural limitation' period provided for in section 10-
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9-1001. The Evertsen Plaintiffs first petitioned the District Court to review the 
Planning Commission's decision on April 29, 1993, 168 days after the Planning 
Commission had issued American Capital its conditional use permit. (Record 
Index at p. 267). Therefore, the Evertsen Plaintiffs' April 29, 1993 suit was time 
barred by section 10-9-1001 of the UMLUDMA. 
It is widely recognized within the zoning context that "review 
proceeding[s] brought after the time period prescribed by statute ha[ve] elapsed 
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." Rathkopf's The Law of Planning and 
Zoning, § 42.04[1] at 42.14 (1993). This principle has been applied to bar late filed 
suits in cases strikingly similar to this case. For example, in St. Germain v. Zoning 
Board of Appeals, 316 N.Y.S.2d 408, 410 (Ny. Sup. Ct. 1970), a New York court 
specifically held that a trial court's extension of the statutory time for seeking 
review of a city's zoning decision was invalid. In Bolin v. City of Portales, 548 P.2d 
1210, 1211-1212 (N.M. 1976), the New Mexico Supreme Court dismissed a suit 
challenging a city's land use decision because the suit was not filed with the 
district court within 30 days of the city's decision, as required by a New Mexico 
statute, despite the plaintiff's assertion that the notice given for the city's hearing 
of the matter had been inadequate. In Serna v. Board of County Commissioners, 540 
P.2d 212, 214 (N.M. 1975), the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a petitioner's 
failure to file for writ of certiorari in a district court within a statutorily prescribed 
30-day period, deprived the district court of jurisdiction to subsequently review a 
county's zoning decision. In Fish Hook Association, Inc. v. Grover Brothers, 417 
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N.W.2d 692, 694 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
dismissed a suit to enjoin a county's issuance of a conditional use permit to a 
developer of a proposed mobile home park. The Fish Hook plaintiffs owned 
residential property adjacent to the proposed mobile home park and alleged that 
they had not received adequate notice of the county zoning authority meeting at 
which the conditional use permit had been granted. Id. The Fish Hook court 
dismissed the suit because the plaintiffs had not brought suit to enjoin the 
issuance of the conditional use permit within a 30-day appellate limitation period 
provided for by the county zoning ordinance and a Minnesota statute. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court's interpretation and application of procedural 
limitation periods set forth in zoning statutes is consistent with the St. Germain, 
Bolin, Serna, and Fish Hook decisions. In Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., the 
Utah Supreme Court dismissed a suit challenging a county zoning authority's 
decision because the complaining party had not commenced his action in district 
court within the 90-day limitation period prescribed by the county's zoning 
ordinance and the then applicable Utah County Land Use Development and 
Management Act. 392 P.2d at 42. As in Lund, the Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to 
the adequacy of notice given for the November 12, 1992 Planning Commission 
meeting was brought beyond the procedural limitation period set forth in the 
UMLUDMA. The Evertsen Plaintiffs first challenge to the Planning Commission's 
November 12, 1992 decision came on April 15, 1993 — 154 days after the 
November 12, 1992 decision; Plaintiff-Appellees first raised the adequacy of notice 
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issue in district court on April 29, 1993 - 168 days after the November 12, 1992 
decision. (Record Index at p. 267). On April 15, 1993 and on April 29, 1993, the 
public notice given for the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting 
was "considered adequate and proper" under Utah law. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
103(2) (1993). Therefore, contrary to Lund and the plain language of the 
UMLUDMA, the District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' 
challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning Commission's meeting 
was time barred because the Evertsen Plaintiffs filed their suit beyond the 30-day 
limitation periods set forth in the UMLUDMA. 
IV. The District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs1 
challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning 
Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting was time barred by a 90-day 
limitation period set forth in the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. 
Under the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act ("UOPMA"), any challenge 
to a city's actions based on inadequate notice must be brought within a 90-day 
limitation period. Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8 (1993). Section 52-4-8 provides that 
[a]ny final action taken in violation of [the public notice 
provisions of the UOPMA] is voidable by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. Suit to void final action shall be commenced 
within 90 days after the action . . . . 
Id. (emphasis supplied). The 90-day limitation period provided for in Section 52-
4-8 expired on February 11, 1993. The Evertsen Plaintiffs could not have lawfully 
challenged the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 decision on April 15, 
1993 or on April 29, 1993 by virtue of the 90 day limitation period set forth in the 
UOPMA. Therefore, for the reasons expressed in Lund, and the other authorities 
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set forth in Point III., above, the District Court failed to properly rule that the 
Evertsen Plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning 
Commission meeting was time barred by the UOPMA. 
V. The District Court could not have concluded that the limitation periods 
set forth in the Zoning Ordinance, the UMLUDMA, and the UOPMA 
were inapplicable to the Evertsen Plaintiffs1 suit. 
Under Utah law, procedural due process requires that cities provide 
adequate notice before taking any action that will cause an individual to be 
deprived of a "significant" property interest. Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Department, 
616 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980). If, for example, a city condemns a landowner's 
property without providing adequate notice to the landowner of the 
condemnation proceeding, any statutory limitation periods that would otherwise 
govern the landowner's ability to challenge the city's condemnation proceedings 
will be inapplicable to the landowner's suit. Salt Lake County v. Murray City 
Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339, 1356 (Utah 1979); W.G. Company v. Redevelopment 
Agency of Salt Lake City, 802 P.2d 755, 765 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As Utah courts 
have carefully noted, however, this rule of law is applicable only when a city's 
actions have caused a "serious" derogation of an individual's property rights, or 
have caused an individual to be deprived of a "significant" property interest. Salt 
Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d at 1344; Worrall v. Ogden City 
Fire Department, 616 P. 2d at 601. In the present case, the District Court did not 
receive any evidence upon which it could have based a conclusion that the 
Evertsen Plaintiffs had been deprived of any such property rights or interests. 
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Therefore, the limitation periods set forth in the Zoning Ordinance, the 
UMLUDMA and the UOPMA were fully applicable to the Evertsen Plaintiffs' suit. 
Unlike the plaintiffs in Worrall, W.G. Company, and Murray City, the 
Evertsen Plaintiffs failed to submit any evidence to the District Court that proved 
that they had been deprived of any significant property interest or had suffered 
any serious derogation of their property rights as a result of the City's actions. 
Appropriately, therefore, the District Court made no Finding of Fact that any of 
the Evertsen Plaintiffs had been so affected. Thus, the District Court could not 
have concluded that the limitation periods governing Plaintiff-Appellees' challenge 
to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning Commission meeting had been 
rendered inapplicable pursuant to the W.G. Company standard. The Utah 
Supreme Court has long recognized that a plaintiff is "out of court" if he fails to 
sustain his "burden, by pleading, or proffer of proof on an essential element of 
[his] cause of action." Hughes v. McCormick, 412 P.2d 613, 613 (Utah 1966). In the 
present case, the issue of whether the Evertsen Plaintiffs had been deprived of 
any significant property interest as a result of the City's actions was essential to 
their ability to invoke the W. G. Company standard, and to pursue an untimely 
appeal of the Planning Commission's decision. Accordingly, when the Evertsen 
Plaintiffs failed to meet this evidentiary burden, the District Court should have 
dismissed the Evertsen Plaintiff suit. 
Under facts similar to those of the present case and under a rule of law 
similar to that employed by the Hughes court, a New York appellate court so 
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ruled. In Wood v. Freeman, 251 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), a city 
zoning authority held a public zoning meeting and granted permission to a 
developer to construct and operate a golf course. Id. Owners of property 
adjacent to the golf course subsequently complained that they had not been 
notified of the city's actions and, therefore, claimed that the city's failure to 
provide actual notice of the zoning meeting constituted an unlawful taking of 
their property without due process of law. Id. The Freeman court dismissed the 
adjacent property owners' suit because they "failed to show that they [had] been 
deprived of property without due process of law ... ." Id. at 998. The Freeman 
court explained that "the mere failure of [the adjacent property owners] to receive 
a notice of [the zoning] hearing did not deprive them of the enjoyment of their 
property; nor ... constitute a taking of [their] property, nor deprive them of its 
use and enjoyment." Id. Similarly, the District Court could not have concluded 
that the Evertsen Plaintiffs had suffered any "serious" or "substantial" deprivation of 
property merely because the City failed to provide them with actual notice of the 
November 12, 1992 Planning Commission meeting. Because the Evertsen 
Plaintiffs failed to prove that they had suffered a serious or substantial 
deprivation of property as a result of the City's actions, and because the District 
Court made no Finding of Fact that the Evertsen Plaintiffs had been deprived of 
any property interest as a result of the Planning Commission's decision, the 
District Court could not have concluded that the limitation periods governing the 
Evertsen Plaintiffs' ability to challenge the Planning Commission's decision were 
SLCl-7707.1 21928 0001 29 
inapplicable to the Evertsen Plaintiffs' suit pursuant to the W.G. Company 
standard. Therefore, the District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen 
Plaintiffs' appeal of the Planning Commission's decision was time barred by the 
statutory limitation periods set forth in the Zoning Ordinance, the UMLUDMA, 
and the UOPMA. 
In summary, under the Freeman, Hughes, and Worrall principles, the 
Evertsen Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they were constitutionally entitled to 
receive actual notice of the Planning Commission's November 12, 1992 meeting; 
the Evertsen Plaintiffs did not prove, nor did the District Court find, that the 
Evertsen Plaintiffs had been deprived of any serious or significant property 
interest as a result of the City's actions. Therefore, the District Court could not 
have concluded that the statutory limitation periods set forth in the Zoning 
Ordinance, the UMLUDMA, and the UOPMA were inapplicable to the Evertsen 
Plaintiffs' suit. Consequently, the District Court should have ruled that the notice 
given by the City for the Planning Commission meeting was "adequate and proper" 
as determined by section 10-9-103 of the UMLUDMA, and that the Evertsen 
Plaintiffs' district court suit was time barred by the statutory limitation periods set 
forth in the Zoning Ordinance, the UMLUDMA, and the UOPMA. The District 
Court committed plain error by failing to so conclude. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
American Capital is entitled to relief from the District Court's order 
because the District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' 
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challenge to the adequacy of notice given for the Planning Commission meeting 
was time barred by statutory limitation periods contained in the Zoning 
Ordinance, the UMLUDMA, and the UOPMA. The District Court could not have 
concluded that these limitation periods were inapplicable to the Evertsen Plaintiffs' 
suit because the Evertsen Plaintiffs failed to prove that they were deprived of a 
serious or significant property interest because the City failed to provide adequate 
notice of the November 12, 1992 Planning Commission meeting. Therefore, the 
District Court failed to properly rule that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' suit was time 
barred because all statutory limitation periods specified in the Zoning Ordinance, 
the UMLUDMA and the UOPMA had expired. 
For the foregoing reasons, American Capital respectfully submits that 
this Court should grant this Appeal and direct the District Court to enter an order 
declaring that the Evertsen Plaintiffs' appeal was not lawfully before the City 
Council, and to order the City to reinstate the conditional use permit issued to 
American Capital by the Planning Commission on November 12, 1992. 
DATED this 4th day of May, 1994. 
DAVID J. 
NILEW. ] 
STOEL RIVES BOLEY JONES & GREY 
Attorneys for Petitioner American Capital 
Development, Inc. 
JORDAN 
PATMON 
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I HEREBY certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
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to the following: 
John Bradley 
Attorney for Lyle Evertsen and Others 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Steven W. Farr 
Attorney for South Ogden City 
Bamberger Square Building 
205 26th Street Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Richard L. Stine 
Attorney for South Ogden City 
2650 Washington Blvd #102 
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ADDENDUM 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
SOUTH OGDEN CITY 
ZONING ORDINANCE 
ADOPTED 8 JANUARY 1980 
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ARTICLE 7 CONDITIONAL USES 
25-7-1. Purpose and Intent 
25-7-2. Conditional Use Permit 
25-7-3. Review Procedure 
25-7-4. Determination 
25-7-5. Basis for Issuance of Conditional Use Permit 
25-7-6. Appeal 
25-7-7. Building Permit 
25-7-8. Expiration 
25-7-1. Purpose and Intent The purpose and intent of conditional uses is to allow in 
certain areas compatible integration of uses which are related to the permitted 
uses of the zone, but which may be suitable and desirable only in certain locations 
in that zone due to conditions and circumstances peculiar to that location and/or 
upon certain conditions which make the uses suitable and/or only if such uses are 
designed, laid out, and constructed on the proposed site in a particular manner. 
25-7-2. Conditional Use Permit A Conditional Use Permit shall be required for all uses 
listed as Conditional Uses in the zone regulations. A Conditional Use Permit may 
be revoked by the City Council after review and recommendation by the Planning 
Commission, upon failure to comply with the conditions imposed with the original 
approval of the permit 
35-7-3. Review Procedure. 
1. Apphcation for a Conditional Use Permit shall be made to the Planning 
Commission. 
2. Detailed location, site and building plan shall accompany the complete apphcation 
forms provided by the City. For structures in existence, only a location plan need 
to be provided. 
3. The apphcation together with all pertinent information shall be considered by the 
Planning Commission at its next regularly scheduled meeting. 
4. The Planning Commission may call a specific public hearing on any apphcation 
after adequate notice if it is deemed in the public interest The Planning 
Commission shall take action on the apphcation by the second meeting of the 
Planning Commission after the apphcation filing date. A record of the hearing 
together with a decision for the denial or approval of the Conditional Use Permit 
with conditions of approval or reasons for denial shall be forwarded to the City 
Council. 
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25-7-4. Determination. The Planning Commission may deny or permit a Conditional 
Use to be located within any zone in which the particular Conditional Use is 
permitted. In authorizing any Conditional Use, the Planning Commission shall 
impose such requirements and conditions necessary for the protection of adjacent 
properties and the public welfare. 
25-7-5. Basis for Issuance of Conditional Use Permit. The Planning Commission shall 
not authorize a conditional use permit unless evidence is presented to establish: 
1. That the proposed use of the particular location is necessary or desirable to 
provide a service or facility which will contribute to the general well-being of the 
community. 
2. That such use will not, under the operation proposed, be detrimental to the 
health, safety and general welfare of the community, nor any part thereof, nor 
threaten damage to the property. 
3. That the use will be compatible with and not offensive to surrounding uses from 
the standpoint of building design, site layout, traffic both externally and internally, 
parking both externally and internally, signs, landscaping, pedestrian traffic, 
lighting considerations, material storage and operational characteristics, etc. 
4. That the proposed use will comply with the regulations and conditions specified 
in this Ordinance for such use. 
5. That the proposed use conforms to the goals, policies and governing principles 
and land use of the Master Plan for South Ogden. 
6. That the proposed use will not lead to the deterioration of the environment or 
ecology of the general area, nor will produce conditions or emit pollutants of such 
a type or of such a quantity so as to detrimentally affect, to any appreciable 
degree, public and private properties including the operation of existing uses 
thereon, in the immediate vicinity of the community or area as a whole. 
25-7-6. Appeal to and Review by the City Council. The decision of the Planning 
Commission shall not become final and effective until fifteen days after notice of 
that decision has been mailed or delivered to the applicant and delivered to the 
City Recorder for presentation to the City Council. It shall not then become final 
if, prior to the expiration of that fifteen days, any interested party has appealed 
the same to the City Council by filing a written notice of appeal with the City 
Recorder or the City Council on its own motion has elected to review that 
decision. 
The decision of the Planning Commission may be appealed by any interested 
party to the City Council by filing such appeal with the City Recorder within 
fifteen days after the notice of decision is sent to the applicant. The City Council 
may review that decision on its own motion made within that fifteen day period. 
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